MEP is a specialist in defence issues, having held this ministerial post from 1999 to 2004. At the European Parliament, where he has been an MEP since 2009, Goerens is a recognised specialist in institutional and security issues.
With the proliferation of initiatives in Europe, of which the presentation of the European Commission’s white paper is the latest, shouldn’t we clarify the responsibilities and role of everyone in Europe on this subject?
Charles Goerens: It will have to be done, but not in a hurry. Defence remains a prerogative of national states; nevertheless, a common reading of the 27 member states is clearly emerging with regard to the Russian threat. In the absence of a decision-making system clearly anchored in the treaties, it was nevertheless necessary to act. Fortunately, there has been a proliferation of initiatives, all converging on the same need: to defend Europeans. In my view, this is a sign of maturity and lucidity on the part of a European political class that is nonetheless often divided on important issues.
With the gradual emergence of a European defence, with perhaps one day elements of a real European army, it will be necessary in the future to complete the treaties and define precisely the role of the European Parliament. Some national parliaments already regard their armies as “parliamentary armies”: in Germany, for example, the army does nothing without the consent of the Bundestag. But this is now a secondary issue.
When the time comes, what do you think would be the optimal architecture for European security? How should the roles be divided?
First of all, political decision-making will remain the responsibility of the member states. But the European Council will have to adopt its own reading of the situation, analyse the points likely to be detrimental to the Union and act accordingly. This is already the case. For its part, the European Parliament will have to play a role of political impetus, pending, I hope, the day when it exercises a role of control over certain aspects, particularly the budget.
I don’t think that in the near future we will be able to go beyond advanced integration of European forces.
As for the commission, when it becomes a real European government and no longer just a potential executive, it will then have a defence minister capable--among other things--of encouraging convergence in arms production between member countries thanks to the rules of the internal market. This is precisely the approach advocated in the white paper on defence presented by Andrius Kubilius, the first European defence commissioner, who wants to reduce the fragmentation of the European defence industry. I don’t think we're very far from that. If it weren’t for the strong presence of the far right in certain member states, this development could even be rapid and without major difficulties. There is also the question of nuclear power.
In my opinion, it is unrealistic to go beyond Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to place willing European countries under the French nuclear umbrella. Moreover, this would strengthen the credibility of European defence; you only have to look at Moscow’s reactions to be convinced of this.
And what place should be given to Nato?
As I see it, there are three possible scenarios. Either the alliance does not evolve, or it ceases to exist, or it continues its activities without the Americans, the latter then adopting a status of political observer similar to that occupied by France after Charles de Gaulle’s decision to leave the integrated command. In the latter case, Washington would not be able to oppose any European decision to deploy troops. The integrated command would remain unchanged. Integrating it into the European institutions would make no sense, given that virtually all European countries are already members.
For European states that are not members, an ad hoc status should be created. Last but not least, it would be necessary to make Article 5 automatic, which it is not at present.
Is the question of a European army relevant in this architecture?
This question is no longer taboo. But how do we go about it? I don’t think that in the near future we will be able to go beyond the advanced integration of European forces. In my view, we should be aiming instead for complementarity in the armaments industries, so as to reduce the number of weapons systems and benefit from economies of scale. Countries could specialise: France, for example, in missile defence and combat aircraft; Italy in helicopters; Germany in tanks. Major efforts will also be needed in the production of drones and satellite surveillance systems.
Funding defence must not mean abandoning funding for social issues. If we neglect social issues, there will no longer be any acceptance of military spending.
With the white paper on defence presented on 11 March, can we talk about a shift in the European economy towards a war industry?
I wouldn’t say that. It is more a question of realising that Europe really needs to ensure its own defence. It’s not just a question of percentages, whether it’s 2%, 3%... If 4% becomes necessary, it will be 4%.
Look at Russia: with around 40% of its budget devoted to defence, there, we are talking about a war economy. We are a long way from that. For Europe, it’s a transition that will have to be implemented gradually. It’s unfortunate that we have to spend so much on armaments, but freedom comes at a price. Funding defence must not mean abandoning funding for social issues. If we neglect social issues, there will be no acceptance for military spending. It is not one or the other, but both together.
All the member states are aware that this is a price to pay, a form of mortgage for future generations. But if we do not leave them a free society, we are exposing them to a terrible world. I believe that adopting such an attitude is responsible.
This article was originally published in .