Caught between Vladimir Putin in the east and Donald Trump in the west, Europe’s leaders have their backs to the wall. “This is a decisive moment for Ukraine and European security,” wrote António Costa, president of the European Council, in his letter convening the meeting. This meeting follows on from the informal brainstorming session held on 3 February in Brussels at the Egmont Palace and the meeting organised on 2 March by the British prime minister, Keir Starmer. The meeting was attended by 11 EU member states (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the Czech Republic) as well as Canada, Norway and Turkey--the country that contributes the largest contingent of troops to Nato.
What can we expect from this meeting? Certainly not a decision to send European soldiers to Ukraine. “That’s not on the agenda,” prime minister (CSV) said on 4 March after his . As things stand, such a decision can only be taken by Nato. Nato is due to hold its next meeting in the Netherlands in June. And therein lies the problem: the proliferation of meetings raises the real, unanswered question: who should do what--or wants to do what--in terms of security in Europe? The EU is an economic alliance whose military vocation is forced and delayed, while Nato is a military alliance whose proper functioning depends on Washington’s goodwill.
Let the volunteers come out of the ranks!
At the summit on 2 March, Starmer said that the UK, France and “one or two other” countries would work with Ukraine on a “plan to stop the fighting,” which they would then present to the US.
In other words, the British and French are seeking to assemble a coalition of the willing for action on the ground. This plan to stop the fighting would be based on three pillars already mentioned by French president Emmanuel Macron at the Paris summit on 17 February: a Ukraine in a position of strength capable of defending itself; European security guarantees--meaning the deployment of troops on the ground--and an American safety net as a last resort. In this vision, the bulk of the work would fall to Europe. A Europe of volunteers. It’s an approach that raises the question of European unity in the military sphere.
An economic agenda
In the meantime, discussions on 6 March--in the presence of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy--are likely to focus first and foremost on increasing defence spending. Increased defence spending and, above all, the means to achieve it. Among the avenues envisaged are greater flexibility in the Stability Pact to allow member states to spend more without being subject to an excessive deficit procedure.
Then there is a reorientation of the use of structural funds and unspent funds from the NextGenEU recovery plan, a broadening of the European Investment Bank’s remit and recourse to debt via a dedicated bond issued at European level. A strong symbolic decision that would have the advantage of being implemented quickly. The on 4 March--a plan that has Frieden’s full support--is likely to feature in the debate.
The 27 member states could also announce a new military aid package for Ukraine, totalling €20bn. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale war, the EU and the 27 have provided €135bn in aid to Ukraine, including €48.7bn to support Kyiv’s army. Between 2021 and 2024, total defence spending by the 27 member states increased by 30% to €326bn, or around 1.9% of the EU’s GDP.
The agenda also includes an exchange of views on European contributions to the security guarantees needed to ensure lasting peace in Ukraine.
Costa hopes that concrete decisions will be taken at the end of the meeting “so that Europe becomes more sovereign, more capable and better able to face the immediate and future challenges to its security.”
This article was originally published in .