Within the state’s remit, the State Information Technology Centre has identified 192 systems affected, 57 of which are accessible via the internet.  (Photo: Shutterstock)

Within the state’s remit, the State Information Technology Centre has identified 192 systems affected, 57 of which are accessible via the internet.  (Photo: Shutterstock)

The two critical PHP vulnerabilities and the response to the risks led the government to identify 192 affected systems and to suspend 18 services. No incidents have been confirmed. However, Luxembourg does not yet know how many private systems have been compromised. The first reports required from essential organisations in March 2027 are intended to reduce this blind spot.

For 26 hours, the public procurement portal was offline. The website of the Luxembourg Independent Audiovisual Authority was taken offline for 18 hours. The monarchy’s websites were offline for three and a half hours. None of these services had been attacked. They were taken offline to prevent them from being attacked.

These disruptions are among the visible consequences of two critical vulnerabilities discovered in PHP. This programming language is used by websites to generate pages, access databases or process user requests. A vulnerability in PHP could therefore allow an attacker to manipulate the server running the website, rather than just what appears on screen. The two vulnerabilities were officially disclosed on 21 October. Technical details had begun to circulate a few days earlier, before patches were available – a time lag that could have allowed hackers to attack a number of systems.

The Cyber Risk Assessment Unit (Cerc) met on 21 October. It recommended that the patches be installed as a matter of urgency. Where this was not immediately possible, organisations were required to assess the risk, implement compensatory controls and, if necessary, temporarily disconnect their systems. Operators were also advised to look for signs of a possible intrusion. An update may close a backdoor at a given moment, but it is not enough to prove that no one had gained access through it previously.

Nearly 200 systems affected

Meeting once again on 28 October, the CERC issued a reassuring update. “Since the disclosure of two critical vulnerabilities affecting PHP, the relevant authorities have so far observed no confirmed attempts at malicious exploitation nor any confirmed compromises linked to these vulnerabilities,” it stated in a press release issued on Friday 30 October. This wording sets out what the authorities have observed and what has been reported to them. It does not allow us to conclude that all potentially affected servers in Luxembourg have been identified, examined and patched. Another factor to bear in mind is that applying a patch immediately is not always the best course of action.

Within the state’s remit, the State Information Technology Centre (CTIE) was able to carry out an audit. It identified 192 systems affected, 57 of which were exposed on the internet. The others were accessible only via internal networks or were involved in the operation of services not directly visible to the public. The CTIE implemented several measures. Some systems were updated with the available patches. Others were isolated, taken offline or had the vulnerable component removed. Where the CTIE was not directly responsible for a system, it contacted its administrators.

A total of 18 websites and services within its scope were taken offline. The portal mae-protocole.public.lu was suspended for 23 hours; marches.public.lu it remained so for 26 hours; alia.public.lu remained unavailable for 18 hours. Several websites linked to previous Luxembourg presidencies of the European Union were also taken offline. The government states that no systems under the CTIE’s responsibility remain vulnerable.

Six organisations have contacted Circl

The figures become much less accurate as soon as one moves beyond this scope. The authorities carried out a scan of IP addresses in use in Luxembourg. They detected 5,195 web servers running PHP. This figure does not mean that 5,195 servers are vulnerable. A server may use PHP whilst having already received the patch. It may also be running a version that is not affected by the two vulnerabilities. The scan identifies the apparent use of the language, but does not reveal the full internal configuration of each system.

Nor does the figure allow for a distinction to be made between public servers and those belonging to private companies. Nor does it cover Luxembourg-based websites hosted on infrastructure located abroad. A company or local authority may have its registered office in Luxembourg whilst operating its website from a server located in Germany, France, the Netherlands or within a global cloud infrastructure.

The 5,195 servers therefore represent a visible scope, not a complete inventory. At the time the government’s responses were provided, six organisations had contacted the Computer Incident Response Centre Luxembourg (Circl). No incidents relating to these vulnerabilities had been reported to it. Govcert had not detected any attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. The Luxembourg Regulatory Institute (ILR) had not received any relevant notifications.

This incident thus reveals two levels of knowledge. The state can compile a list of the systems managed by the CTIE, decide to take them offline and verify that they have been brought back online. At national level, the authorities also rely on information held by businesses, local authorities, their IT service providers and their hosting providers.

15 March 2027: deadline for critical entities

An organisation may entrust its website, applications or backups to an external provider. This outsourcing does not automatically give the organisation a complete overview of the software in use, the speed at which patches are applied, or the other customers using the same infrastructure. Nor does it relieve the organisation of its responsibility to manage risk.

That is precisely one of the problems that the new European cybersecurity framework, known as Nis2, aims to address. The Luxembourg Act of 5 May 2026 does not apply to all small businesses. It is aimed in particular at medium-sized and large organisations operating in sectors such as energy, transport, healthcare, water, digital infrastructure, IT services, public administration and space. Certain organisations are affected, regardless of their size, due to the nature of their activities or their significance.

The law distinguishes between “essential” and “significant” entities. The former comprise the largest or most critical organisations. They are subject to more direct oversight by the regulator. The latter must also manage their risks and report significant incidents, but are not, by default, subject to the same annual reporting requirements.

An ILR regulation dated 26 October sets out what essential entities under its supervision must report. They must first describe the safeguards already in place. This exercise covers, in particular, incident management, business continuity, system access, staff training, backups, suppliers and physical security. They must then examine risk scenarios. For each scenario, they must assess the potential impact, the likelihood of it occurring, the planned safeguards and the residual risk following their implementation. Finally, they must present a multi-year action plan. Each improvement must be linked to a risk, a deadline, a priority and a designated responsible party. An organisation cannot, therefore, simply state that a safeguard is missing; it must also indicate how and when it plans to implement it.

Certain organisations will also be required to draw up a list of the suppliers or service providers on which their operations depend. The aim is to identify the services whose disruption could prevent the organisation from functioning, even where the failure or attack occurs at a third party’s premises. The first annual declaration under this new regulation must be submitted by 15 March 2027 at the latest. It will be mandatory even if security measures have not changed since the previous year. The ILR may also request a detailed risk analysis and evidence demonstrating that the measures announced are actually effective.

The NC3 has been offering support for quite some time now

Organisations already have tools at their disposal to prepare for this assessment. The National Cybersecurity Competence Centre (NC3) offers CyberCheck, a questionnaire that assesses their level of maturity, identifies gaps and provides recommendations. It also trains them in Monarc, a risk analysis tool recommended by the regulator. According to Dominique KogueDominique Kogue, Director of the NC3, the most frequent enquiries from organisations still concern where to start the process and which framework to use. This question sums up the difficulty of the task ahead. Before presenting a credible plan, an organisation must know which systems it possesses, who operates them, which service providers it relies on, and what the consequences would be if they were unavailable.

The declarations will be submitted via Serima, the ILR’s centralised platform, or by any other secure means that the regulator deems equivalent. Serima enables standardised analyses to be carried out and measurements or incidents to be reported to the relevant authorities.

The result will not be a comprehensive list of all servers in Luxembourg. The reports will remain specific to each organisation. However, they must provide the regulator with an initial, structured overview, under NIS2, of the risks identified by the most critical entities and the shortcomings they undertake to rectify.

The ILR and the Financial Sector Supervisory Commission (CSSF) are required to maintain lists of essential and significant entities falling within their remit. These lists are not made public. Nor is the number of organisations already recognised as essential in Luxembourg, or their breakdown across the various sectors, publicly available.