Peace does not exist

The main lesson of history is that conflict is the norm, not the exception. Three major civilisational, political and geographical factors explain this reality.

First of all comes the role of civilisation, which constitutes the highest level of grouping of peoples around common elements such as languages, religions, customs and historical narratives. Each of these has a tendency to consider itself at the centre of the world and to seek its own emancipation, often to the detriment of others. From the Crusades to the current tensions in the Middle East, conflicts arise from these logics, such as the current war wanted by Vladimir Putin, which according to him does not pit Russians against Ukrainians, but Slavic-Orthodox civilisation against Western civilisation.

To this factor is added, in a cyclical way, a political dimension. The crisis of 1929, followed by widespread protectionism, plunged the world into the Great Depression and facilitated the rise of authoritarian regimes. When those in power are no longer able to cope with social or economic problems, people turn to authoritarian leaders who build their power on the identification of an enemy to be eliminated: immigrants, “Mexican aliens,” “left-wing lunatics.” Fear of the other is one of the most powerful engines of cohesion. There’s nothing new about this mechanism, but it’s still terribly effective: and it’s been ten years since we’ve seen its big comeback on a global scale.

Finally, geographical characteristics, such as strategic locations or natural resources, play a crucial role in the recurrence of conflicts. For example, Crimea has been disputed for centuries, not least because it offers Russia access to a port that doesn’t freeze in winter; China also covets Taiwan to break the encirclement of Western allies in the China Sea, whilst Greenland is now attracting strong interest from the Americans in order to extend their influence in the Arctic.

The last hours of the “Pax americana”

The controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the global financial crisis of 2008 accelerated the rejection of the Western hegemonic model, to the point of rallying around this opposition the great powers of civilisations which, until then, had almost nothing in common. The Brics+ alliance, which has included Iran since last year, now embodies the entire club of opponents of the West. This bloc represents 46% of the world’s population and almost a third of global GDP. It has a clear agenda: to weaken the dollar as the dominant currency, to promote a “multipolar” world order in which each civilisation could live by its own rules, and to delegitimise the Western democratic model, seen as ineffective, incapable of reform, and a symbol of a world in decline.

The coup de grâce has come from where we least expected it: from the country at the very heart of this model, the United States. Vice-president Vance’s speech in Munich, in which he explained to the Europeans how wrong their “humanist” vision was, and the sad episode of harassment of Ukrainian president Zelenskyy at the White House, revealed to the whole world that the new world order promoted by America was no longer based on human rights, but on the law of the strongest. We then witnessed--live--the last hours of the “Pax americana.”

What are the strategic priorities for Europe?

Every country in the world quickly realised that it was no longer possible to rely on the United States to ensure its security. South Korea, Indonesia and even Japan, which until recently capped its defence budget at 1% of its GDP, now have good reason to feel vulnerable to the threat of bellicose neighbours.

As Europe has a GDP almost ten times greater than Russia’s, in theory it would only need to spend a little more to change the balance of power. But in reality, its defence industry is lagging so far behind that this is not possible. In order to change this, it will therefore have to focus on three main priorities.

The first is to mobilise know-how where it really exists. There are no fewer than 19 tank models on our continent, most of which are only produced in very small quantities, like the French Leclerc or the Swedish CV90, even though operational effectiveness depends above all on mass. To date, only the German company Rheinmetall, which manufactures the Leopard 2--considered to be one of the most efficient tanks in the world--has a large-scale industrial capacity, thanks in particular to synergies arising from the conversion of German car factories. The same logic would apply to combat drones and military aircraft, where BAE Systems and Dassault Aviation respectively are leaders. It is now essential to manufacture “European” products in sufficiently large quantities to be truly effective.

The second priority is to ensure its own security over the long term. The European defence industry, in addition to being underdeveloped, is entirely dependent on its “old” ally on the other side of the Atlantic. Sixty-three percent of its military spending is on American equipment, whilst certain crucial areas--such as surveillance and intelligence--are simply delegated to them. The United States is second to none with a fleet of 247 military satellites, compared with 40 for European countries. In this area, Europe needs to achieve critical mass in order to gain credibility. This will only be realistic if we make use of the joint expertise of industrial flagships such as Thales, Leonardo and Airbus, which have unique and complementary know-how in aeronautics and advanced technology.

Finally, the last priority is to make up the lost ground in digital technology and regain a form of sovereignty in this area. In the 21st century, information is the sinews of war: possessing it confers immense power, whilst failing to protect it leaves us vulnerable to all manner of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. According to Oliver Wyman, 92% of Western Europe’s digital data is stored in the United States, on AWS, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud servers. The effect of scale in the hyperscale sector is such that, in the absence of strategic support, a company like OVH Cloud--the leading provider of hosting solutions in Europe--had little chance of success. The situation could change if the European Union chose to give greater support to its digital champions while ensuring that its SMEs are protected in the face of a market law that does not include the now fundamental criterion of our sovereign issues.

Europe, which took just a few decades to build a flourishing economic area, now has little time to protect it effectively in the face of a world that has become unstable and threatening once again. Only its industrial and technological capacity, driven by its businesses, can ensure its long-term survival.

Timothée Au Duong is equity manager at Edmond de Rothschild Asset Management (Luxembourg).

This article was originally published in .