Five years ago, the Green Deal embodied the hopes of a new European political project, a new economic model and a new social contract. But the political winds have shifted since then. Overwhelmingly, the pact has become a target--more rightly a rallying point--for populist and far-right parties. Even the traditional right, while maintaining talk of ambitious environment policies, is quick to point to flaws in the pact.

A shared ambition

The Green Deal was launched in 2019 with the aim of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 and halting the decline in biodiversity.

To achieve this, it takes a cross-sectoral approach, integrating all sectors affecting energy, transport, buildings, waste, food, nature conservation and even trade policy. The text was supported by a favourable political climate. In 2019, there was a strong mobilisation of young people demonstrating every Friday for the climate under the impetus of Greta Thunberg. And in the elections that year, the European Greens achieved their best results in the European Parliament with 9.85% of the vote and 74 seats, making their group the fourth largest in the assembly.

This was enough to persuade new commission president Ursula von der Leyen, who came from the ranks of the European People’s Party (EPP), to make the environment and sustainable development a priority during her term. This has led to concrete advances, such as the development of sustainable energies (the target is to achieve a 42.5% share of renewable energies in overall energy consumption by 2030, compared with 32% previously); the planned end of internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035; carbon taxes at borders; and regulations on imported deforestation and nature restoration.

Loss of momentum

This political will culminated in the summer of 2021 with the adoption of the “Fit for 55” package, which raised the target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 40% to 55% by 2030.

The second half of the von der Leyen’s mandate, however, has been less green. Its ecological agenda has been hit hard by the consequences of Covid-19 and the Russian war in Ukraine, bearing a return of inflation and an energy crisis on a scale not seen since the 1970s.

From 2022 onwards, one setback followed another, starting with the “farm to fork” strategy, marred by the agricultural crisis at the beginning of the year. The plan to halve the use of pesticides was then buried in the European Parliament and the “greening” of the Common Agricultural Policy was abandoned. Following a vote in the European Parliament, the subsidies originally created to promote agro-ecological practices were transformed into unconditional aid.

Ultimately, von der Leyen has been accused of bowing to pressure from right-wing and populist parties that do not make ecology a priority.

This political ebb has been accompanied by a drop in the ranking of public concerns. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey in April 2024, environmental and climate change issues are now only in fifth place among the concerns of EU citizens, behind Ukraine, immigration, the international situation and the cost of living. (In Luxembourg, it shares fourth place with health and the international situation.)

The state of the discourse

The discourse around the environment is changing: whereas the debate began by focusing on the risks of inaction, it now explores the benefits of action as well. Proponents of climate policy have also become more vocal about the relationship between ecological peril and social issues, as it becomes increasingly obvious that climate change will disproportionately affect the poor and the otherwise marginalised.

Indeed, the new key word in climate policy is “equity.”

Déi Gréng, LSAP and déi Lénk are leading this charge. “I want to work for a socially just Europe, so that the ecological transition benefits everyone,” said déi Gréng’s  in . “For me, it’s clear that if we want energy security, food security or to re-industrialise, we need an ecological transition… if the Green Deal is not to end up gutted or in a drawer, the ecologists must be strengthened.””

“The real challenge is to make a success of the digital and climate transitions without excluding people,” said  of LSAP . “That’s why we want to ensure that there are no pauses in our climate policy, and that it benefits everyone. The green pact must have a red heart.”

“A Europe where the economy and GDP growth are not the main factors of success,” commented déi Gréng candidate Tania Mousel, her ideal Europe. “A Europe where social inequalities are reduced. A Europe that reduces its climate footprint to preserve the environment for future generations.”

Notions of fairness in the ecological transition are also discoverable in the CSV and DP programmes.

“We are in favour of climate protection that is profitable, socially balanced and fair, and in which everyone can and wants to participate,” says the CSV in its programme. “Only then will it be supported by the public… We want to convince people through incentives. We will only succeed in protecting the climate, which is urgently needed, if climate protection has a positive connotation and is perceived in a positive light. And if it is also profitable for citizens and businesses.”

Says the DP’s election programme: “To ensure that the climate transition is fair, financial and technical support must be given to the regions most affected by the transition to a low-carbon economy.”

Further to the right, the ADR and déi Konservativ - d’Fräiheetspartei are criticising what they consider an ideological approach “whose representatives,” in the ADR’s language, “often pursue policies of redistribution under the guise of protecting the climate and the environment.” These two parties advocate a climate and energy policy that is “realistic and based on facts rather than, as has been the case to date, on ideology.”

This article in Paperjam. It has been translated and edited for Delano.