Despite political rhetoric around strategic autonomy and a surge in infrastructure investments since 2022, the European Union is highly unlikely to fully sever its dependency on Russian gas by 2027, as outlined in a roadmap on 6 May 2025. While reducing Russian gas imports from 45% in 2021 to 19% in 2024 is a remarkable achievement, a complete and permanent cut-off remains an extremely ambitious target at best, when viewed through the lenses of infrastructure constraints, binding legal commitments, energy market dynamics and geopolitical divisions among member states.

This has implications not only for policymakers but also for ordinary citizens and businesses across the EU, where energy prices, supply stability and economic competitiveness are directly shaped by these supply dependencies. Here’s why these challenges make full independence from Russian gas a near-unattainable goal by the targeted deadline.

Progress in reducing dependency

The EU has certainly made strides in reducing its reliance on Russian gas. According to the European Commission, the EU removed 60bn cubic meters (bcm) annually in gas imports between 2022 and 2024. This decline was achieved through a combination of reduced pipeline imports and increased diversification of supply sources, including increased imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from countries such as the United States, Norway and Azerbaijan. Additionally, the rapid development of LNG regasification terminals in countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Finland highlights both political will and institutional capacity to reduce Russian energy dependence.

However, a decline in imports does not equate to full disengagement. Russian gas continues to enter the European market in significant volumes. In 2024, ten member states imported a total of 52 bcm of Russian gas--32 bcm via pipeline and 20 bcm as LNG--accounting for approximately 19% of total EU gas imports. Notably, LNG imports rose by 12% compared to 2023, increasing from 18 bcm to 20 bcm, while pipeline imports saw an even sharper rise of 26%, from 25 bcm to 32 bcm. The commission also acknowledges that even after the expected end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine in 2025, Russian gas would still account for around 13% of the EU’s total gas imports.

Russian energy exports to the EU extended well beyond gas. In 2024, three member states imported 13m metric tonnes (mmt) of crude oil from Russia, while seven continued to receive over 2,800 tonnes of enriched uranium or uranium in fuel form, or depended on related nuclear services. This continued inflow of Russian energy underscores the enduring nature of Europe’s dependence and raises fundamental questions about the EU’s actual energy autonomy.

Infrastructure constraints and geopolitical divides

Infrastructure limitations further complicate the EU’s ability to fully disengage. Several Eastern and Southeastern European countries remain structurally dependent on Russian supply. Hungary, Serbia and parts of Austria continue to source 70% to 80% of their gas from Gazprom. In parallel, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary also rely heavily on Russian pipeline oil and benefit from temporary exemptions under the EU sanctions regime.

For these countries, Russian energy is not only a matter of energy security but also a strategic lever within EU policymaking. Their reliance complicates efforts to reach consensus on tougher measures. As a result, any attempt to implement a bloc-wide ban on Russian gas would likely encounter strong resistance from these member states, underscoring the fragmented and politically sensitive nature of EU energy policy.

Legal commitments and long-term contracts

Beyond infrastructure, legal and commercial obligations continue to tie many EU energy firms to Russian suppliers such as Gazprom. Currently, around two-thirds of Russian gas imports to the EU are delivered under long-term contracts, with the remaining third traded on a spot basis. These long-term agreements, often spanning 15 to 20 years, typically include take-or-pay clauses--requiring payment for contracted volumes regardless of actual delivery--which are enforceable under international arbitration frameworks.

While the commission has proposed a ban on new Russian gas contracts beyond 2025, existing agreements remain legally binding and protected under international law. Unilateral termination of these contracts could expose European companies to costly litigation, substantial financial penalties and heightened risks of supply disruption, particularly during periods of peak demand. This legal reality limits the EU’s ability to fully disengage from Russian gas in the short to medium term, regardless of political intent.

Green alternatives

Substituting Russian gas with renewable energy sources is progressing, but at a slower pace than required for a complete break. The REPowerEU strategy the production of 35 bcm of biomethane by 2030, but in 2023, output was just 3.5 bcm. The widespread use of heat pumps and the electrification of heating systems in Western Europe are increasing, but these technologies are still insufficient to replace the high-temperature combustion needed for heavy industry. Hydrogen, often touted as a long-term solution, is still too immature in both technology and market scale to serve as a viable substitute for Russian gas in the near term.

Financial and political realities

From a financial perspective, fully transitioning away from Russian gas would require substantial public investment in renewables, gas storage, cross-border interconnections and social support mechanisms to mitigate the impact of rising energy costs. The EU’s REPowerEU plan estimates that €210bn will be needed by 2027, but national fragmentation in energy policy makes further escalation politically challenging. The pressure of inflation and fiscal constraints on governments across the continent reduces the appetite for large-scale energy transitions.

Rather than a decisive and irreversible break with Russian energy, the EU’s current trajectory reflects a strategy of managed dependence. The emphasis has shifted to diversification, risk dispersion and supply chain flexibility. Russian gas may enter the EU system through intermediaries, third-party traders or LNG swap arrangements, allowing European governments to distance themselves politically from Russian energy while maintaining supply security.

In summary, while the EU is likely to continue reducing its visible reliance on Russian gas in political discourse and public commitments, the underlying economic, legal and infrastructural realities suggest that full decoupling will stretch well beyond 2027. Ongoing imports of Russian LNG, binding legacy contracts and persistent physical infrastructure dependencies--especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe--will keep parts of the bloc tied to Russian energy. Without a coordinated legal and infrastructural overhaul, and the political will to confront internal divisions, the EU’s ambition to fully sever its energy ties with Russia by the 2027 deadline will remain unattainable.